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Abstract
As of January 2006, the United States was the only major receiver of children through
intercountry adoption that had not implemented the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry
Adoption. The U.S. signed the Hague Convention in 1994, but did not pass implementing
legislation until 2000. Regulations pursuant to the legislation were proposed in 2003, but final
regulations did not go into effect until March 2006. The slow pace was partly the result of
Congressional wrangling over designation of a regulator and partly the result of a prolonged
conversation between the designated regulator and the adoption community over specific
regulations.
Finalization of the regulation brings the Hague Convention into force in the United
States, but the current system is inadequate to protect the rights of allchildren and families as the
Hague Convention intends. Two parts of the regulations are problematic, especially in
combination. First, only substantial, not strict, compliance is required of adoption providers.
Second, the U.S. encourages competition between accreditors of adoption providers. We argue
that the regulations will increase the costs of adoption services at the same time that quality, at
best, will not improve. We conclude that regulation of adoption should be centralized in order to
comply with the intent of the Hague Convention.
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I. Introduction
The 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption came into force in the United States in
March 2006.1 Before 2006, the United States was the only country that annually received more
than 1,000 intercountry adoptees that had not implemented the Hague Convention.2,3 The slow
pace of implementation of the Hague Convention in the U.S. was partly the result of
Congressional wrangling over the designation of a domestic “Central Authority” to regulate
intercountry adoption, and partly the result of a prolonged conversation between the designated
Central Authority and the adoption community over the specifics of the regulations. Regulations
were proposed in 2003, but progress towards finalization was halting.
While finalizing the regulations brings the Hague Convention into force in the United
States, the full benefits of the Hague Convention will not be realized with the system as it is
currently envisioned. We argue that the regulations will increase the costs of adoption services
at the same time that quality, at best, will not improve. We conclude that regulation
(specifically, the monitoring of providers and the enforcement of standards) of the market for
adoption services should be centralized in order to be consistent with the intent (and letter) of the
Hague Convention.
Two parts of the regulations are, in combination, problematic. The first part is the
performance criterion for adoption service providers. Only substantial compliance is required;
strict compliance is not required for accreditation.4 The second part is the law regarding the
selection of the accreditors of adoption service providers. The U.S. Central Authority encourages
1

The final regulations were published in the Federal Register 71(31), February 15, 2006. State Department 22 CFR
Parts 96, 97, and 98.
2
Belgium ratified in 2005. For ratification dates and country-specific details see HccH, “Status Table.” Available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (accessed 9 May 2006).
3
Jeff D. Opdyke, ‘Adoption's New Geography,’ Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 2003, D1. ("The U.S. adopts more foreign
children than all other nations combined.").
4
Federal Register 68(178), September 15, 2003, Subpart E, section 96.27 (a).
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all interested parties to apply to become accreditors.5 The many accreditors will have
overlapping jurisdictions and will compete for the business of the many adoption providers that
seek accreditation. Together, these two parts of the regulations will prevent the regulations from
providing the assurance of the rights of children and families that the Hague Convention intends.
We begin by addressing the question of why regulation of the market for adoption
services is desirable, whether the regulation is on a local, national, or international level. Next,
we present a brief history of the international movement to regulate intercountry adoption, as
expressed in the Hague Convention on intercountry adoption. Following this brief account of the
development of the Hague Convention, we discuss U.S. efforts to ratify the Convention,
including the specific regulations finalized in 2006. Finally, we show that while, in general, the
regulation of adoption has the potential to produce the desired results, the specific regulations are
unlikely to do so.
II. Economic Rationale for Regulation of Adoption Services
Economists identify three main rationales for regulation: monopolistic abuse, imperfect
information, and the existence of external effects or public goods.6 In these three kinds of
market failure the unregulated outcome fails to produce the optimal quantity or quality of the
good or service. Regulation can move the outcome towards the optimal quantity or quality in the
cases. Parties to the Hague Convention agree to enact regulation to solve the problems of
imperfect information and public goods aspects in the market for adoption services.
A. Public Good Aspect

5

Federal Register 68(178), September 15, 2003, Subpart B, section 96.4. Private accreditors must be non-profit.
For a thorough review of the literature on the political causes of regulatory policy see Roger G. Noll, “Economic
Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation,” in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.) Handbook of Industrial
Organization, Volume II (Elsevier Science Publishers, 1989), 1254-1287.
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Economic theory postulates that goods and services that produce satisfaction only for the people
who consume and produce them are most efficiently produced by private firms in unregulated
markets. Consumption of each of these “private” goods is limited to the individual consumer (or
a well-defined group of consumers), and the production and consumption of private goods does
not affect other people. Not so with adoption services. When an adoption takes place, the wider
society—in both the sending and the receiving country—is affected. Parental rights are
exchanged, the definition of family is transformed, and the sending society loses a potentially
productive future worker while the receiving society gains one.
Moreover (as the cases of the moratoria on intercountry adoption from Romania and
Cambodia demonstrate),7 the market for adoption services relies on a service it cannot provide
itself—the protection of the rights of children and families involved in adoption. The protection
of the rights of children and families has benefits to society that are greater than the benefits to
any single individual. Further, the protection of rights is non-rival and non-excludable. That is,
everyone benefits from the protection of rights, even those who do not adopt. Thus, the
protection of rights in adoption is a public good. We know that public goods are under-provided
by markets, which is why public goods are usually closely regulated, or even directly produced
by governments.8,9 The protection of rights in adoption, if achieved through the regulation of
adoption services, is therefore likely to increase the number of intercountry adoptions.
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The State Department has information on the Romanian moritorium at
http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/notices/notices_2211.html (accessed 6 May 2006). Information about the
investigation of adoption practice in Cambodia can be found at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/international.html (accessed 10 May 2006).
8
The protection of rights in adoption also meets the definition of a global public good, similar to peace, distributive
justice, and environmental integrity. See Inge Khaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern (eds.), Global Public
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, published for The United Nations Development Programme
by (New York: Oxford University Press 1999).
9
Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 202, 115 Stat. 38, 47 (codified at
I.R.C. 23, 137 (2000)).

5

B. Imperfect Information Aspect
In some markets, producers have more knowledge than consumers about the quality of the
product or service provided. When the information about the quality of a product or service is
complex and expensive to collect, consumers may not, despite their best efforts, be able to
discover all they need to know in order to make well-informed decisions. The imperfect
information rationale has been the historical motivation for regulation of consumer products,
workplaces, and occupations.10
The imperfect information problem in adoption arises because it is difficult for
prospective adoptive parents to know whether an adoption service provider has high ethical
standards.11 Specifically, prospective adoptive parents may be concerned that (1) an adoption
service provider only places children who are truly legally available for adoption, (2) that the
adoption service providers are interested primarily in finding the best “match” of family for a
child, and (3) that the adoption service providers are not charging or condoning the payment of
fees beyond the cost of providing adoption services.
Regulation can improve the outcome of markets with imperfect information,12 such as the
market for adoption services, in two ways. First, the government can set minimum standards,
which protects consumers from the hazards of consuming low-quality products or services. In
the case of adoption, the minimum standards are stated in terms of ethical social work practice.
Second, government can compel producers to disclose information about the quality of their
products and services, thus increasing the amount of information available to consumers and
10

Howard K. Gruenspecht and Lester B. Lave, “The Economics of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation,
in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume II (Elsevier Science
Publishers, 1989), 1508- 1550.
11
See Schweitzer, Harvey, and Daniel Pollack, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Adoption Social Work, 44 Family
Court Review 2, 258-269.
12
See e.g., Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's Right's
Perspective, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 1 (2003).
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decreasing the cost to consumers of obtaining the information. In the case of adoption, the
regulatory remedy is a required audit of adoption service providers that explicitly accounts for
the legality of placements, the internal matching criteria, and the disbursement of all fees
collected and donations accepted.
III. History of International Regulation of Intercountry Adoption
Prior to 1989, there existed only regional agreements regarding intercountry adoption, which
were enacted by countries in the Americas and western and northern Europe.13 But because
many adoption service providers operate in many countries at the same time, and because many
intercountry adoptions involve several jurisdictions, regional agreements did not suffice.14 In the
late 1980s, the United Nations began an effort to establish an international basis for the
regulation of intercountry adoption.15,16
A. Involvement of the Hague
The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) explicitly
acknowledges the importance of intercountry adoption to children and families.17 The preamble
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See Daniel Pollack, Moshe Bleich, Charles J. Reid, Jr. & Mohammad H. Fadel, “Classical Religious Perspectives
of Adoption Law”, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 718 (2004).
14
See Joanne Selinske et al., “Ensuring the Best Interest of the Child in Intercountry Adoption Practice: Case
Studies from the United Kingdom and the United States”, 80 Child Welfare 656 (2001).
15
For a discussion of the need for international cooperation, see Ethan Kapstein, “The Baby Trade,” 82 Foreign
Affairs 6 (November/December) 2003, 115-125.
16
See E. Wayne Carp, Family Matters: Secrecy and Disclosure in the History of Adoption (Harvard University
Press, 1998); Joan Heifetz Hollinger, “Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice,” in 1 Adoption Law and Practice
1-19 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2000). See generally Berend Hovius, Family Law: Cases, Notes and Materials
915-78 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing Canadian adoption law); Elizabeth Bartholet, “International Adoption: Propriety,
Prospects and Pragmatics”, 13 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 181 (1996) (describing the problems with
international adoptions and how international law attempts to balance the interests of those countries that demand
adoption and those countries that supply the children to be adopted).
17
For a complete discussion of the UNCRC as the foundation for the Hague Convention, see William Duncan
(1994), “The protection of children’s rights in intercountry adoption,” in L. Hefferman (ed), Human Rights—A
European Perspective (The Round Hall Press/Irish Centre for European Law) and G. Parra-Aranguren (1998), “La
tarea complementaria de le Convencion de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos del Nino realizada por las
Convenciones de la Conferencia de Law Haya de Derecho Internacional Privado,” in Revista de la Facultad de
Ciencias Juridicas y Politicas (106).
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to the UNCRC expresses the right of the child to grow up “in a family environment, in an
atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.” Article 20 of the UNCRC recognizes that
when birth families are unable to provide a suitable environment, alternative care—including
adoption—should be sought. The UNCRC also explicitly acknowledges the importance of
national and international regulation of adoption in order to protect the rights of children and
families. Article 21 requires states that allow adoption to take steps to be certain that adoption
serves the best interests of the child. Moreover, the UNCRC posits that children involved in
intercountry adoption are entitled to protections “equivalent to those existing in the case of
national adoption.”18
The Hague Conference on Private International Law began to consider what was to
become its thirty-third Convention in January 1988. The representatives of Hague-member
countries believed that the problems in intercountry adoption went beyond the problems
addressed by the 1965 Hague Convention on adoption which addressed the Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions. The work of drafting the
Convention began in October 1988. Both Hague member states and non-member states
participated in drafting the Convention. The Convention was unanimously approved on 28 May
1993.19
Worldwide acceptance and ratification of the Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry has been extraordinary swift by historical

18

Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention #33, Convention on the Protection of Children and
Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, Article 21(c) <
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69> (last accessed 9 May 2006).
19
G. Parra-Aranguern, Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Explanatory Report on the Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption,” <
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=2279&dtid=3> (last accessed 9 May 2006).
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standards.20 By September 2000, 41 countries had become contracting states. As of February
2006, 65 states had ratified or acceded to the Convention.21 The states included a wide variety of
sending and receiving countries; a partial list is given in Table 1.
B. Goals of the Convention
The specific provisions of the Convention are intended to encourage a more child-centered
practice in intercountry adoption.22 The intent is to focus adoption practitioners on finding an
appropriate placement for each waiting child and to limit the extent to which the practice of
intercountry adoption focuses upon the quest of prospective adopters to find a child.
During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of cases of trafficking in children were revealed in
the international press. These cases included the sale of children by parents and orphanages, as
well as the abduction of children for the purpose of adoption.23 Arguably the most important
goal of the Hague Convention is the prevention of such abuses.24 Establishing a system of
international cooperation for the prevention of abuse is a responsibility of countries under the
UNCRC.25 Pursuant to this goal, the Hague Convention delegates the responsibility for ensuring
proper consent to the adoption to the country of origin.26
The Hague Convention also seeks to remove incentive for parent-centered practice on
intercountry adoption by prohibiting financial gain from adoption, including payments to birth
20

William Duncan, “The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption”, in Peter Selman (ed.), Intercountry adoption: developments, trends, and perspectives. (London: British
Agencies for Adoption and Fostering), 40-52.
21
The Hague Conference regularly updates its list of contracting states on its website: <
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69> ( accessed 9 May 2006).
22
Duncan, see above n 20, ,46-47.
23
The scandals are summarized in Ethan B. Kapstein, “The Baby Trade” 82 Foreign Affairs 6, see especially p.
119.
24
Article 1 and Article 21(c).
25
UNCRC Articles 20-21. Text available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm (last accessed 10 May
2006).
26
Article 4(c): “persons, institutions and authorities have given their consent freely, in the required legal form, and
expressed or evidenced in writing. Article 4(d) expresses a similar requirement for consent of the child, when
appropriate.
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parents and institutions beyond actual costs incurred, such as provision of social services, travel,
and child support for the pre-adoption period. 27, 28
At the same time that prohibiting financial gain from adoption protects the rights of
adopted children, the measure also protects the rights of adoptive parents. Congressman
Benjamin Gilman expressed it this way: “These standards will provide parents with the
confidence that this emotional undertaking will not leave them open to fraud or abuse.”29
Accreditation of adoption agencies under the Hague Convention is intended to require full
financial disclosure, so that practices such as outright extortion and mandatory “donations” can
be curbed.30
Finally, in addition to the ethical goals of preventing abduction, trafficking and improper
financial gain, it is hoped that the provisions of the Hague Convention will reduce “delays,
complications and [the] considerable costs” of intercountry adoption.31 Domestic law under the
Hague Convention is required to clarify the status of the adopted child in the receiving country to
“streamline documentary requirements” for immigration of the adopted child.32
To achieve its goals, the Hague Convention requires each contracting state to designate a
Central Authority. The division of responsibilities between Central Authorities in the sending
and receiving states is given is clearly articulated. It is the responsibility of the sending state to
“ensure that the child is adoptable, that due consideration has been given to the possibilities for
27

Article 4(c): the consents [of parents, institutions and authorities] have not been induced by payment or
compensation of any kind…” Article 4(d) similarly requires that, when the consent of the child is appropriate, the
consent not be induced by payment. Article 8 requires Central Authorities to “prevent improper financial or other
gain. Article 28 is more specific, confining the exchange of monies to costs and expenses (including reasonable
professional fees) and limiting the earnings of adoption service providers.
28
Ethan B. Kapstein, “The Baby Trade”, 82 Foreign Affairs 6 (2003): 115-125.
29
Benjamin A. Gilman at US Congress Hearing October 20 1999. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives (2000).
Implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. Hearing before the Committee on International
Relations. Wednesday, October 20, 1999. Serial No. 106-110. Available:
http://www.house.gov/internationalrelations [accessed March 4, 2004].
30
Hague Convention, Article 11
31
Duncan, see above n. 20, 47.
32
IAA section 302 amends the Immigration and Nationality Act section 204(d)(2))..
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placement of the child in that state, that an intercountry adoption is in the child’s best interests,
and that the relevant consents have been freely given.”33 It is the responsibility of the receiving
state to “determine that the prospective adopters are eligible and suitable to adopt, that they have
been appropriately counseled, and that the child will be authorized to enter and reside
permanently in that state.” 34, 35
IV. History of U.S. Regulation of Intercountry Adoption Services
In the United States, the regulation of adoption services, including intercountry adoption
services, has not been directly regulated by the federal government. Federal involvement in
adoption has been limited to the financing of adoptions of children in foster care who cannot
return to their birth families and to tax deductions and credits for adoptive families.36 Like most
family law, law concerning the regulation of providers of adoption services has been left to the
states. Each state licenses agencies and social workers using its own guidelines;37 each state has
its own rules regarding relinquishment and parental consent; each state has its own rules
regarding what payments adoptive parents may make to birth parents.38

33

Article 28. Duncan, see above n 20, 44.
Article 28. Duncan, see above n 20, 44.
35
National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, The Adoption Home Study Process, at
http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/f_homstu.cfm (last accessed 2 May 2006).
36
Federal laws financing adoption from foster care include: Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption
Reform Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-266 Section 203), The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (P.L. 96272), Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-89). Federal tax law regarding adoption includes:
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34 Section 125), Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514), Minimum
Wage Increase Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-188 Section 1807),Tax Relief Act (P.L. 107-16, Title II, Section 202).
37
Best practice guidelines are updated and published by the Child Welfare League of America, CWLA Standards of
Excellence for adoption services (Rev. ed.) (Washington, DC: CWLA, 2000).
38
Naomi R. Cahn and Joan Heifetz Hollinger (eds.), Families by Law (New York: New York University Press,
2004); Richard Leiter (ed.) National Survey of State Laws (Detroit: Thompson Gale, 2003); Stephen Macedo and
Iris Marion Young (eds.), Child, Family and State (Yew York: New York Univ. Press, 2003); Sarah H. Ramsey and
Douglas E. Abrams, Children and the Law in a Nutshell (St. Paul, MN: Whomson/West, 2003); Barbara R. Hauser
and Julie A. Tigges, Women’s Legal Guide (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publ, 1996); Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Law
and Practice (New York: M. Bender, 1988). For a less academic approach, see American Bar Association, The
American Bar Association Guide to Family Law: The complete and easy guide to all the laws of marriage,
parenthood, separation and divorce (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1996). Also see, Madelyn
Freundlich and Lisa Peterson, Wrongful Adoption: Law, Policy and Practice (Washington DC: CWLA Press 1998).
34
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A. Designating a Regulator
Given the limited role of the federal government in adoption law, it is perhaps not surprising that
the United States took so long to bring the Hague Convention into force. The U.S. signed the
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption in 1993. After seven years and extensive
Congressional hearings, the International Adoption Act (IAA) of 2000 was signed by President
Clinton. A primary stumbling block for passage of implementing legislation was the designation
of a Central Authority. The IAA designated the Department of State (as opposed to the
Department of Health and Human Services) as the Central Authority for the U.S. in matters of
intercountry adoption. The Department of Health and Human Services has direct experience
with social work best practice, including adoption practice. Further, the Department of Health
and Human Services has experience with the regulation and accreditation of health care facilities.
While the both Departments supported the designation of DHHS as Central Authority,39
Congress chose the Department of State because of its experience “on the ground” in sending
countries.40 State Department personnel process orphan visas for the travel of the adoptees of
U.S. citizens, and the State Department has been involved in evidence gathering and prosecution
of cases of intercountry child abduction and trafficking.

39

In fact, a representative of the State Department testified before Congress that the Department has no experience
in child welfare or human services and has no first-hand knowledge of the myriad ways in which intercountry
adoptions are facilitated (US Congress Hearing October 20, 1999).
40
The Senate and the House versions of the bill originally designated different Central Authorities. S 682 (wanted
State), HR 2342 (wanted State), and HR 2909 (wanted HHS). Some members of Congress felt very strongly that
HSS would not be able to incorporate the duties of Central Authority. See comments of Richard Burr (NC), US
Congress Markup March 22 2000 and US Congress Hearing October 20, 1999. However, the policy question here is
one of public perception of the relative ability (in other words, the credibility) of the two departments. See also the
testimony of Mary A. Ryan, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, US Dept of State at US Congress Hearing
October 20, 1999: “The Administration strongly believes that the accrediting function should rest with the
Department of Health and Human Services…as the only Federal Government agency with relevant experience in
evaluating and working with domestic adoption programs and social service providers, is better suited to handle this
function than the Department of State…It has the experience, it has the knowledge, and it best for the children.”
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Once it was designated Central Authority, the State Department set about the task of
writing the specific regulations to fulfill its responsibilities.41 Because of its lack of experience
in the fields of social work and accreditation, the State Department required a significant amount
of time for information gathering. Information gathering was conducted under contract with the
private consulting firm Acton-Burnell. Acton-Burnell was well known to the State Department
but was not well-versed in adoption. The input of researchers, adoption agencies, adoptive
parents and adoptees was gathered, and public meetings were held during the process of drafting
the regulations.42 After three years the State Department published its draft of proposed specific
regulations.43
Some observers of adoption policy have been frustrated by the regulations by what they
believed to be misinterpretations of the IAA and the Hague Convention in the proposed
regulation.44 Furthermore, at a public meeting at the State Department on 10 November 2003, a
number of small agencies expressed frustration with the State Department for not reaching out
more visibly to the entirety of the adoption community. The State Department responded to the

41

Almost all of the Central Authorities designated by states contracting to the Hague Convention are human services
agencies or adoption-specific agencies. See HccH, “Authorities”,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.authorities&cid=69 (last accessed 10 May 2006).
42
Summaries of the meetings and some documents are available at the Hague Adoption Standards Project Website
at http://www.hagueregs.org/ (last accessed 10 May 2006).
43
Department of State, 22 CFR Parts 96 and 98, “Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption; Intercountry
Adoption Act of 2000; Accreditation of Agencies; Approval of Persons; Preservation of Convention Records;
Proposed Rules,” Federal Register, September 15, 2003.
44
For example, Hogan, M. , Gibbs, P., Greenman, F., Hoard, C., Margolies, L. & Wei, A., “Comments to the
Department of State on Proposed Regulations: Intercountry Adoption,” Center for Adoption Research,
http://www.centerforadoptionresearch.org/ (last accessed 11 January 2005); Maureen Hogan, “The Struggle
Between Families and Adoption Providers Over the Hague Convention, Center for Adoption Research,
http://www.centerforadoptionresearch.org/
default.asp?action=article&ID=39&CategoryID=26&CategoryName=Federal (last accessed 11 January 2005);
various authors and documents on the website of the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/policy/hagueregs.html (last accessed 11 January 2005).
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frustration of these parties by extending the public comment period from three months to four
months. In January 2005, the State Department issued its responses to the comments.45
B. Specifics of the Regulation
Some aspects of the implementation of the Intercountry Adoption Act have been uncontroversial.
For example, while the Hague Convention makes verification of the consent of birth families the
responsibility of the Central Authority in the sending country, the U.S. plans to double-check
sending country efforts; to wit, the Intercountry Adoption Act adds two sections to the
Immigration and Nationality Act.46 The U.S. Attorney General will review intercountry
adoption cases to confirm that the purpose of the adoption is to “form a bona fide parent-child
relationship.” Further, provisional upon U.S. Attorney General review of consents, the
Intercountry Adoption Act allows for the immigration of children who are not technically
orphans.
Other aspects of the Intercountry Adoption Act have generated more heat. For example,
one of the issues that has bothered adoption services providers the most is the requirement that
accredited providers prove that they are adequately insured for liability.47 However, in terms of
achieving the goals of the Convention, the regulatory structure matters more than the
performance requirements for individual adoption service providers.

45

U.S. Department of State, “Announcement of Publication on Department's Website Of Public Comments
Received on Proposed Hague Regulations” at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/
implementation/implementation_1519.html (last accessed 11 January 2005).
46
IIA sections 103 and 302, modifying the Immigration and Nationality Act section 101(b)(1)(G). See U.S.
Department of Justice (2001). Immigration and Naturalization Service. Fact Sheet. The Intercountry Adoption Act
of 2000: Approval of the Hague Convention regarding intercountry adoptions. Available: http://www.immigration
links.com/news/news980.htm [accessed May 13, 2004]. for a summary of these changes.
47
Proposed regulations §96.45 and 96.46; IAA §203 (b)(1)(E) require liability coverage of $1 million per
occurance. The final regulations §96.33(h) set liability requirements at $1 million per firm.
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The regulations rely on the IAA: “The Secretary [of State] may authorize public or
private entities to perform appropriate central authority functions…”48 The responsibilities of
the Central Authority, as well as public authorities and adoption service providers, are defined in
Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Hague Convention. Article 7 gives Central Authorities the nondelegable job of coordination with the sending state. Article 9 lists the jobs of day-to-day
placement and reporting, which the Central Authority may undertake itself or delegate to either
public authorities or “other bodies duly accredited [that is, adoption service providers].”
Sandwiched between, Article 8 states, “Central Authorities shall take, directly or through public
authorities, all appropriate measures to prevent improper financial or other gain in connection
with an adoption and to deter all practices contrary to the objects of the Convention.” Article 8
does not, therefore, appear on its face to allow the Central Authority to delegate the job of
detection and deterrence of financial impropriety to a private firm. But that is exactly what the
IAA and the State Department regulations do.49 The regulations put the State Department at
arm’s length from providers, as it delegates the job of front-line detection and prevention of
abuses in intercountry adoption to (as yet to be named) accreditors, which may be public
authorities such as state departments of child welfare services, but which may also include
private firms such as the Council on Accreditation.
1. Accreditation vs. Licensure
Adoption service providers are currently regulated through licensure by the states, through the
state departments of child welfare and protective services. However, the majority of licensing

48

Section 102 (f) “Methods of Performing Responsibilities.”
The State Department acknowledged these objections in Federal Register 71(31) on February 15, 2006. II.A. and
II.B.

49
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standards in the states concern domestic adoption, or are limited to activities within the state.50
Moreover, licensing standards vary widely, so that state licensing cannot be used as a meaningful
national standard. At a Congressional hearing in 1999, Hague Coordinator of the Joint Council
on International Children’s Services Susan Freivalds testified that, “Although it would be
convenient and easier for Joint Council agencies to rely only on State licensure, after six years of
deliberation we have determined that State licensure does not rise to the level of quality standard
that is needed for high quality intercountry adoption services.”51
In the regulations, the system of accreditation of adoption service providers that would
facilitate intercountry adoptions in Hague contracting countries is separate and fundamentally
different from the system of state licensure. In fact, the system provided for by the IAA52 and
fleshed out the State Department regulations53 is not a system of licensure at all, but a system of
accreditation. Accreditation, in the American sense of the word, is a method of industry selfregulation.54
Under licensure, rules must be clearly stated and well-understood. In theory, at least,
there is little room for the licensor’s discretion in evaluating compliance. Accreditation, on the
other hand, specifically allows for a level of compliance that is indeterminate rather than fixed.
In some cases, indeterminacy is an asset. For example, in state corporate law, it is widely agreed

50

See testimony of Patricia Montoya, Commissioner for Children, Youth, and Families, Department of Health and
Human Services at US Congress Hearing October 20, 1999. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives (2000).
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that it is the indeterminacy of Delaware’s law regarding the fiduciary duties of corporations give
the state an advantage in attracting corporations.55 The indeterminacy of the Delaware corporate
rules allows judges to be sensitive to corporate needs, possibly at the expense of creditors and
consumers. Indeterminacy in adoption rules will allow accrediting agencies to be similarly
sensitive to the needs of adoption service providers, possibly at the expense of children and
prospective adoptive families.
There is some question as to whether regulation by accreditation in the American sense is
what the framers of the Convention had in mind. While “accreditation” is the vocabulary used in
the English text of the Convention, the following excerpt from Article 10 of the Hague
Convention defines regulation in terms of “competence,” a concept more akin to licensure:
“accreditation shall only be granted to…bodies demonstrating their competence to carry out
properly the tasks with which they may be entrusted (emphasis added).” 56,57
2. Substantial Compliance
The regulations58 require only that accredited bodies demonstrate substantial compliance with
the standards of performance laid out in the document.59 The status of “accredited” will not,
therefore, mean that an adoption service provider clearly has met all of the standards.
“Accredited” will mean only that an adoption service provider has met most of the standards.
Moreover, the definition of most may differ from accreditor to accreditor, and it is possible that
accreditors may base their evaluations on whether an adoption service provider is moving
55
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towards compliance with standards, rather than actually complying with standards. That
accreditation is to be based upon substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, with the
stated standards is one of the key flaws in the regulations, and is discussed in additional detail
below.
3. Overlapping Jurisdictions and Competition between Accreditors
State departments of child welfare services, which, again, already license some adoption service
providers in their states, may apply to the State Department to become accreditors.60 Under the
regulations, the State Department may also authorize private firms to be accreditors. There is no
upper limit upon the number of accreditors that the State Department may authorize. And there
is no geographic limit to the “jurisdiction” of a private accreditor (although state departments of
child welfare services may not compete with each other in jurisdiction.61 An adoption service
provider will be able to choose its own accreditor from among many on the authorized list, and
may even choose to switch accreditors when a re-accreditation is required at a later time if it
desires. In other words, there is not an assignment of accreditors to adoption service providers,
but the “jurisdictions” of accreditors overlap, creating the potential for competition between
accreditors.
First, the State Department will face the logistical challenge and cost of maintaining and
communicating with multiple accreditors. The cost will be borne either by prospective adoptive
families or by the taxpayers. However, the cost of providing for competition between multiple
accreditors will not be offset by the benefits of consistent quality in adoption services that can be
trusted by sending countries and prospective adoptive parents.

60
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The overlapping jurisdiction of accreditors provides incentive for competition. Usually
competition is beneficial to society because competition, all other things equal, leads to an
efficient outcome. In this case, adoption service providers will seek the services of an accreditor
that maximizes the profits of the provider, or equivalently, that minimizes its cost of
accreditation. Standard microeconomic theory predicts that only the lowest cost accreditors
would survive, so that adoptive families would pay the lowest possible amount for the assurance
that adoption providers are on the up-and-up. Recent work on the market for auditing services
indicates that, at least in theory, industry self-regulation (accreditation) can lead to efficient
outcomes.62 This is, most likely, what the authors of the regulations had in mind.
However, the even if the competitive, efficient, lowest-cost outcome does obtain, the
outcome will not also meet the goals of the Hague Convention. It will not meet the goals
because there is no reason to expect all accreditors to provide exactly identical services. In fact,
the accreditors would have an incentive to be a little bit different from one other. The
“substantial compliance” requirement opens the door for this product differentiation.63
To simplify, imagine that accreditors come in two varieties: high-cost, high-quality, and
low-cost, low-quality. Perhaps the high-quality accreditors have experience in accreditation in
other industries, so people believe that they can do a more thorough job. A high-quality
62
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American Law and Economics Review 2 (2001), 302-319.
63
Roberto Romano advocates this sort of “product differentiation” in regulation. Romano advocates the substitution
of a system of competing state regulations to supplant the federal monopoly on regulation of corporate securities
issuance. The idea is that with competition, states will develop laws that are in line with investor interests, which
will lower the cost of capital, increase share value, and attract firms to the regulatory jurisdiction. This will work
only if investor interests are not subverted and asymmetric information problems are not persistent. It will not work
in regulation of intercountry adoption because of the severity of the asymmetric information problem and the
pressure on agencies to control the price of adoption services. Further financial capital is very mobile; provision of
adoption services is less so, insofar as the same agency usually performs a home study, provides placement services,
and post-placement services. Provision of competent adoption services from afar would increase the cost
significantly, offsetting any gains from increased confidence obtained from rule-shopping in a regime of competitive
federalist adoption regulation. Romano, Roberta, "The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation"
(July 2001). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-49; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 258. Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=278728 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.278728.

19

accreditor will be able to charge more for its services, as compared to a less reputable, lowerquality accreditor. Providers that use high-quality accreditors will, in turn, have an incentive to
advertise that fact to families because the demand for quality in accreditation is a derived
demand; that is, the willingness of an adoption provider to pay for accreditation will depend on
how families value accreditation. Some families are willing and able to pay more for adoption
services that use high-quality accreditation. Some families will not be able to pay more for high
quality. This subverts the intent of the Hague Convention, which is to ensure that all adoption
service providers meet high standards so that the rights of all families and children are protected
equally.64
It seems unlikely that the regulations will prevent the low-quality accreditors from
accrediting low-quality providers. First, again, the law only requires substantial compliance.
Second, low quality accreditors and providers will persist because the standards to which
providers will be held will be partly generated by the providers themselves; this is the American
understanding of “accreditation” that is reflected in the fact that the regulations allow accreditors
to have standards that differ from one another. Third, the law enforcement role of the State
Department is one-step removed from the accreditation process.65 If there is little threat of
enforcement, some accreditors and providers will have little incentive to form strict standards
and stick to them. Fourth, providers that specialize in limited services, such as conducting only
the home study or providing only the legal services, do not have to be independently
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accredited.66 They can act as supervised subcontractors to accredited providers, and
subcontractors will have little incentive to maintain high standards.67 Finally, providers are not
required to provide all of their adoption-related information to accreditors, but are only required
to provide the information regarding Hague Convention-covered adoptions.68 Under these
regulations “mistakes” will be easily hidden.
The existence of both high-quality and low-quality accreditors will lead to one of two
outcomes. The first possibility is that low-cost, low-quality accreditors will supplant high-cost,
high-quality accreditors. This “race to the bottom” is common in circumstances in which the
quality of a good or service is unknown to the consumer before a transaction.69
Fortunately, the unsavory race-to-the-bottom outcome is unlikely. So long as highquality accreditors can signal their quality directly to providers and at least indirectly to
families—for example through reputation—both high quality accreditors and low quality
accreditors will persist. Families who are not willing or able to pay the higher cost of adoption
services from a provider that uses a high-quality accreditor will be left with the services of
providers that meet only the lower standards of the low-quality accreditors. Caveat emptor.
But, of course, a caveat emptor system is what is in place today; it is the caveat emptor
system that has spawned the abuses in intercountry adoption that the Hague Convention and the
IAA seek to eliminate. Therefore, the regulations impose costs (the cost of the accreditation
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process itself and supervision of accreditors by the State Department) that will be passed on to
adoptive families and taxpayers, but provide only limited benefits to the adopted families, the
adoptees, and society.
V. Effective Regulation of ICA
The current regulations are unlikely to be effective in meeting the goals of Hague
Convention. Before advocating an alternative to the current regulations, it seems advisable to
ask whether effective regulation of intercountry adoption is an attainable goal at all. In this
section, we use a recently developed political economy framework to show that effective
regulation of adoption services is possible.
In their book on the success and failure of government policy, Amihai Glazer and
Lawrence Rothenberg present a compelling case that the ability of government to achieve the
objectives of policy depends upon four interrelated factors, which they term “economic
constraints.”70 Economic constraints include the credibility of the government’s commitment to
the policy objectives and whether there is the possibility of multiple equilibria in the outcomes of
the behavior being regulated.71
The existence of multiple, self-sustaining equilibria is an important precondition for
success of policy because then policy “can be viewed as an attempt to nudge behavior toward a
particular equilibrium (p. 6).” The current equilibrium in the market for intercountry (and also
private domestic) adoption services is characterized by low quality providers operating side-by-
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side with high quality providers. “Low quality” in this context refers to providers that violate the
rights of adoptees or adoptive parents. The goal of the Hague Convention and its implementing
legislation and regulations is to push the equilibrium in the market for intercountry adoption
services in the direction of consistent “high quality,” an equilibrium in which the rights of all
participants in an adoption are protected.
Credible commitment refers to the ability of lawmakers and officials to convince others
that the regulation will be taken seriously and that violations will be redressed. To the extent that
lawmakers and officials are subject to the influences of special interests and public opinion,
government credibility can be questioned. Credibility is important because it factors into the
rational response of people to the policy. When people weigh the costs and benefits of
compliance with the policy, credibility affects the calculation by figuring into the probability that
compliance will be worthwhile and the probability that non-compliance will be detected and
punished.
Key to the success of regulation of intercountry adoption services is the credibility of the
government’s commitment to the protection of the rights of children and parents in adoption.
However, the commitment of the government to the protection of rights in adoption is not
communicated clearly in the IAA or in the regulations. The credibility of the government’s
commitment to the goals of the Hague Convention is questionable on three grounds, which have
already been discussed. First is the decision to delegate regulatory authority to the Department
of State rather than to the Department of Health and Human Services. The second is the decision
for US-style accreditation with a substantial compliance standard rather than a stricter licensing
procedure. The third is the decision for multiple accreditors with overlapping jurisdictions. The
first issue, choice of Central Authority, is less critical than the second two. The Department of
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State could attain credibility by adopting a model of centralized regulation of intercountry
adoption services.
VI. Conclusion
Because both high-quality and low-quality accreditation exists in the market under the
regulations, the rights of children and families (in the U.S. and in sending countries) will not be
equally protected. Equal protection is likely to require centralized accreditation standards and
procedures. In fact, centralization has been the norm when we seek to protect the human rights
(like the right of workers to unionize or the civil rights of all citizens). In these cases, regulation
is held close, detection and enforcement occurs within a government department or commission.
Similarly, when the public gains from compelling information disclosure, regulation tends to be
centralized.
For example, the regulators of intercountry adoption have a charge originating from the
Hague Convention and the Intercountry Adoption Act that is similar to the charge of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission because regulation of both adoption and employment are
primarily concerned with the protection of rights. The charge to regulate adoption also has
similarities to the charge of the Securities and Exchange Commission because the regulation of
intercountry adoption is concerned with the ethical behavior and full financial disclosure. Both
the EEOC and the SEC are centralized systems that, despite recent problems, historically have
demanded a high level of compliance.72
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Other countries have moved towards centralization in the regulation of adoption. In the
Netherlands, the Intercountry Child Welfare Organisation (now Worldchildren) was established
under the Ministry of Justice in 1975. It was hoped that the Child Welfare Organisation would
have responsibility for all intercountry adoptions, but competition emerged. During the 1980s
there was an increase in concerns about the variability of standards between agencies. In
response, the Act on Intercountry Adoptions of 1988 set up centralized licensing requirements
enforced by the Ministry of Justice.73
In the United Kingdom, the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act of 1999 “can be seen as
attempting to use regulation to promote good practice in ICA” with a view towards controlling
“thwarted adopters some of whom engage in abuses of various kinds.”74 The 1999 Act promotes
centralization and limits competition in the provision of intercountry adoption services by
prohibiting private home studies, and it reduces the temptations facing prospective adoptive
parents by restraining the ability of judges to circumvent social work guidelines.75
A centralized regulator of intercountry adoption services would be able to compel strict
compliance with uniform standards of adoption practice and would prevent competition from
undermining the goals of the Hague Convention.76 Hopefully, a more centralized system of
accreditation may yet emerge.
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Table 1: Parties to the Hague Convention
Highlighted: Major Receiving Countries
Not Highlighted: Major Sending Countries
Member States
Country
Signed

Ratificati
on
26 May
05

Entry into Force

Central Authority

1 Sept 05

Service de l'Adoption internationale
within the Service Public Fédéral
Justice, additional authorities
designated for each language
community
State Secretariat for Human Rights,
Program for Cooperation on
International Adoption and State
Agencies
Ministry of Justice

Belgium

27 Jan 99

Brazil

29 May 93 10 Mar 99 1 July 99

Bulgaria

27 Feb 01

Canada

12 Apr 94

15 May
02
19 Dec 96

Denmark
Finland

2 Jul 97
19 Apr 94

2 Jul 97
1 Nov 97
27 Mar 97 1 July 97

France

5 Apr 95

20 June
98

1 Oct 98

Italy

11 Dec 95

18 Jan 00

1 May 00

Mexico

29 May 93 14 Sep 94

1 May 95

Netherlands
Poland

5 Dec 93

26 Jun 98

1 Oct 98

12 June 95 12 June
95
29 May 93 28 Dec 94
10 Oct 96 28 May
97
16 Jan 95 24 Sept
02

1 Oct 95

Romania
Sweden
Switzerland

1 Sept 02
1 Apr 97 (varies
by Territory)

1 May 95
1 Sept 97
1 Jan 03

Human Resources Development &
Territorial Ministries of Social
Service
Minister of Justice
Finnish Board of Intercountry
Adoption Affairs
Central Authority for Intercountry
Adoption, whose secretariat is
provided by the Mission de
l’adoption international
National Board for Intercountry
Adoptions
Systems for Integral Family
Development
Ministry of Justice Prevention, Youth
and Sanction Policy Department
Ministry of Labor and Social Policy
Romanian Committee for Adoption
Public Authorities or Bodies
Accredited
Federal Office of Justice, Office for
the International Protection of
Children

must include foreign aid directed at reducing the poverty and conflict that makes children available for ICA in the
first place.
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UK

12 Jan 94

27 Feb 03

1 June 03

USA

31 Mar 94

n/a

n/a

Non-Member States
Columbia
1 Sept 93
Guatemala
Accession
India
9 Jan 03
Phillipines
17 Jul 95

13 July 98
26 Nov 02
6 Jun 03
2 Jul 96

Department of Health, Adoption and
Permanence Team (Intercountry
Section)
n/a

1 Nov 98
1 Mar 03
1 Oct 03
1 Nov 96

Instituto Columbiano de Beinestar Familiar
Procuraduria General de a Nacional
Central Adoption Resource Agnecy
Intercountry Adoption Board

As of 10 May 2006, the Russian Federation has signed but not yet ratified. Major sending
countries that are not signatories include Cambodia, Haiti, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Ukraine,
Vietnam.
Sources: HccH, “Status Table.” Available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (accessed 9 May 2006).
HccH, “Authorities.” Available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.authorities&cid=69 (accessed 9 May 2006).
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